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T

his quote from the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Edwards v. California
focuses on the issue of whether states
can establish monetary barriers to restrict
citizens moving across state boundaries
to pursue making a living. The Court
also has noted in several decisions
that “the right to move freely in search
of economic betterment is a mark of
national citizenship and fundamental in
our system of constitutional guarantees”
(Roback 1943). This article examines
one such potential barrier—occupational
licensing—to learn whether it restricts
migration across state borders. To the
extent that it does, I propose policy
recommendations to minimize these
barriers in order for individuals to be
able to work in government-regulated
occupations.
Occupational licensure, the legal
process establishing qualifications to
practice a trade or profession, has become
one of the most significant labor market
regulations in the United States. The
percent of the workforce licensed at the
state level grew from around 5 percent
in the 1950s to almost 23 percent in
2008, with a 28 percent increase since
1980 (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). At the
same time, migration rates within the
United States have fallen dramatically,
with a decline of 50 percent in the gross
flow of people across states over the last
20 years (Kaplan and Shulhofer-Wohl
2015). Figure 1 shows the growth in
occupational licensing coverage of the
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workforce and the decline in interstate
migration rates. During this early period,
gross interstate migration was about 3.5
percent, but by 2014 it had declined to
1.5 percent, with the most rapid decline
following 1985 (Molloy, Smith, and
Wozniak 2011). To what extent has
the growth in occupational licensing
coverage of the workforce contributed to
the decline?
Analysis of Occupational Licensing
and Interstate Migration
The study of licensing and interstate
migration has a well-developed history in
policy analysis. Holen (1965) examines
the relationship between state licensing
arrangements and professional practices
(specifically medicine, dentistry, and
law) and how it affects interstate mobility
and the allocation of professional labor
resources. She finds that the empirical
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that professional licensing arrangements

Occupational licensure
has become one of the most
significant labor market
regulations in the United States.
may reduce the ability of the labor market
to most efficiently allocate its human
capital resources.
More recently, Federman, Harrington,
and Krynski (2006) estimate the effects
of licensing regulations on the entry
of manicurist immigrants into the
occupation in the United States. This is
the first analytical study that examines
the links between licensing and the
migration patterns in a low-skilled
occupation. Their findings show that
the level of migration is influenced by
the existence and restrictiveness (in
terms of minimum entry standards) of

Figure 1 Occupational Licensing and Interstate Migration, 1950–2008

Gross interstate migration rate

“Mobility . . . is basic to any guarantee of
freedom of opportunity. The result would be
a substantial dilution of the rights of national
citizenship, a serious impairment of the
principles of equality. Since the state statute
here . . . involved such consequences, it runs
afoul of the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” –Edwards v.
California (1941)

and practices in dentistry and law restrict
interstate mobility among dentists and
lawyers and distort the allocation of
professional personnel in these fields. In
a follow-up analysis, similar to Pashigian
(1979), Kleiner, Gay, and Greene (1982)
find that restrictive licensing may
operate as a barrier to mobility, causing
a misallocation of labor resources across
U.S. states, with increased earnings for
the practitioners in those states with the
most restrictive barriers. These barriers
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state licensing regulations. In particular,
they estimate that the requirement to
have an additional 100 hours of training
reduces by 4.5 percent the likelihood
of having a Vietnamese manicurist,
while states requiring some level of
English proficiency were 5.7 percentage
points less likely to have a Vietnamese
manicurist.
DePasquale and Stange (2014)
examine the influence of the nurses’
compact on mobility. The Nurse
Licensure Compact, introduced in 1999,
was created with the intent to provide
greater mobility for nurses. It allows
registered nurses and licensed practical
nurses with licenses in one compact
member state to practice in other states
without obtaining a separate license.
The authors find that nurses that live
in a border metropolitan statistical area
that crosses multiple state lines see a
1.2 percentage point increase in the
probability of living in one state and
working in another following their home
state joining the compact. The authors
also find that the reduction of licensing
barriers on cross-state mobility appears to
widen the geographic reach of the nurse
labor market.
Johnson and Kleiner’s (2015)
more comprehensive analysis of five
universally licensed occupations shows
that, after controlling for demographic

Restrictive licensing may
operate as a barrier to mobility,
causing a misallocation of labor
resources across U.S. states.
characteristics, individuals in these
regulated occupations have lower
interstate migration rates than their peers
in other occupations, while the rate at
which they move within states is similar.
To establish whether or not licensing
is behind these differences, the authors
perform a difference-in-difference
analysis using changes in state licensing
laws. State policies on accepting those
who fulfill licensing requirements in
other states as qualified to practice in
their state (called endorsement) and on
forming agreements with other states
on establishing licensing requirements

OCTOBER 2015
(called reciprocity) are amended often.
For example, for lawyers, Johnson
and Kleiner find that states that adopt
these more flexible policies have higher
migration rates compared to states with
no such policies. They find that for these
five universally licensed occupations, the
additional costs placed on migration have
restricted the movement of individuals
in licensed occupations, accounting for
part of the decrease in overall migration
within the United States.
Taken together, these studies on
interstate migration support the view
that regulation may limit the number
of practitioners in a country and that a
policy of reducing barriers to interstate
migration would provide benefits to
workers and consumers. The ability
to move across state lines with fewer
impediments and have permission to
work would allow individuals to more
easily go to where there are jobs. This is
particularly important because the growth
in wage variation may make it more
advantageous to move across state lines
(Moretti 2012).
From Research to Policy
In a 2011 executive report, the Obama
administration highlights the obstacles
that occupational licensure regimes place
on military spouses’ careers when they
move from state to state. In particular,
the report lists as a priority developing
“career and educational opportunities
for military spouses . . . by reducing
barriers to employment and services due
to different state policies and standards”
(U.S. Department of the Treasury and
U.S. Department of Defense 2012).
This issue continues to be a topic of
discussion for the Joint Forces task force,
an initiative led by Michelle Obama and
Jill Biden to improve wellness, education,
and employment opportunities for
veterans and their families.
Some of the greatest variations in
occupational licensing requirements
influence teachers. For example, all 50
states and the District of Columbia have
some sort of reciprocity or endorsement
scheme for out-of-state teaching
applicants. Within each category,
though, the degree of reciprocity and

endorsement can vary immensely. For
example, Maine endorses an out-of-state
applicant for licensure who has taught
for five of the last seven years as long as
she has gone through a state-approved
education program in another state. In
North Carolina, an out-of-state teacher
with the same amount of experience
must be “highly qualified” in his
current state and meet North Carolina
exam requirements or have National
Board Certification to be eligible for

When licensing is deemed
to be in the public interest,
weighed against the economic
costs, states and localities
should accept licenses
granted by other states.
endorsement (Public Schools of North
Carolina 2002).
The following commentary from
a public school teacher illustrates the
influence of interstate regulations on
potential migrants’ ability to move across
state lines: “I had reciprocity in New
Mexico from Louisiana, no problem.
Now, I am moving to Illinois and having
to test all over again. I’ve tried applying
online to public schools, and they won’t
even let you submit without a license and
have strongly worded warnings about
contacting schools directly” (Arbury et
al. 2015, p. 26).
Another illustration of the “border
battle” comes from a high school
principal: “It would be great if Minnesota
and Wisconsin would have some sort
of reciprocity agreement. I work in a
border town, and we get a lot of qualified
applicants from across the river. We can’t
keep them though, they have to go back
to their state after their student teaching
is over. I also think this pool of teachers
could also fill content gaps” (Arbury et
al. 2015, p. 27).
Policy Changes
Based on the legal and economic
issues presented, state licensing standards
should allow individuals to move
across state lines with minimal costs for
retraining or residency requirements.
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When licensing is deemed to be in the
public interest, weighed against the
economic costs, states and localities
should accept, as much as possible,
licenses granted by other states. The
Nurse Licensure Compact mentioned
earlier is one example: all states
party to the compact have agreed to
accept nursing licensure applicants
from the other party states without
additional requirements. In the case of
endorsement, a state will accept out-ofstate applicants as long as the origin state
has substantially equivalent licensure
standards as the destination state
(DePasquale and Stange 2014).
Recognition of occupational licenses
across states may not benefit all licensed
workers equally. For example, the
decision to move often depends on
both age and education, with younger
and more-educated workers usually
having the most to gain from migration.
Calls to reduce occupational licensing

“The right to move freely in
search of economic betterment
is a mark of national citizenship
and fundamental in our system
of constitutional guarantees.”
barriers to interstate mobility have
come from the executive branch of the
federal government, including the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and the
U.S. Department of Defense (2012).
The executive branch has made these
policy recommendations because, owing
to variations in state licensing laws, the
families of some military personnel have
had a difficult time pursuing their careers
as they move between states. Recently
proposed policy would more fully
implement what the U.S. Supreme Court
deemed crucial in Edwards v. California
(1941): “mobility . . . is basic to any
guarantee of freedom of opportunity.”
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